Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and Capital Controls: A Model and a Test. by Pasricha, Gurnain Kaur
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Imperfect Competition in Financial
Markets and Capital Controls: A Model
and a Test.
Gurnain Kaur Pasricha
University of California, Santa Cruz
11. December 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12125/
MPRA Paper No. 12125, posted 13. December 2008 06:35 UTC
Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and
Capital Controls: A Model and a Test.∗
Gurnain Kaur Pasricha
University of California, Santa Cruz
December 11, 2008
Abstract
This paper explores the implications of financial repression, specifically, imperfect
competition in the financial sector and capital controls for equilibrium interest rates
and current account imbalances; and the implications of liberalization. I find that (1)
interest differentials between home and foreign markets exist and are higher the fewer
the number of domestic financial institutions (2) liberalization of the domestic financial
sector - i.e. increasing the number of players - exacerbates current account imbalances
in growing economies and reduces revenues from repression (3) revenues from financial
repression decline when capital controls become porous (which may be a consequnce of
trade liberalization), making liberalization of domestic financial sector more palatable
to the domestic governments. An empirical exercise validates several predictions of the
model.
∗My sincere thanks to my advisor, Joshua Aizenman for his guidance and help. Address for Correspon-
dence: Graduate Student, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064. Email:
gpasrich@ucsc.edu. Ph: (831) 419 0044.
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1 Introduction
Financial repression refers to the existence of restrictions on activity of the financial sector,
including but not limited to interest ceilings, excessive reserve requirements, credit allocation
ceilings or direction of credit to priority sectors, entry barriers and controls on the capital
account that reduce efficiency of the financial system (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw 1973). Many
developing countries impose one or more such controls on their financial systems. Studies on
financial repression have focussed on identifying incentives for repression (tax revenues being
the most important - Jinjarak (2006) updates Giovannini and DeMelo (1993) estimates of
government revenues from repression and finds mean revenue among 62 developing countries
to be 4 per cent of GDP in recent years), on its implications for growth (Epsinosa and Yip,
1996; Eichengreen, 2001; Gourinchas and Jeanne 2006; Henry, 2007), exchange rate man-
agement (Kletzer and Kohli, 2001; Bernhard and Leblang, 1999) and crises. The objective
of this paper is twofold: (a) to explore the implications of financial repression, specifically,
imperfect competition in the financial sector and capital controls, on the equilibrium interest
rates and current account imbalances, and (b) to explore the impact of financial openness on
the revenues from repression, thus explaining the negative association between these on the
one hand, and between trade openness and financial openness on the other(Jinjarak, 2006;
Aizenman, 2008).
Several studies have documented the existence of interest differentials, particularly in
emerging markets (Pasricha, 2008; Vieria, 2003; Chinn and Meredith, 2004; Chinn, 2006,
Singh and Banerjee, 2006). This paper models an economy with monopolistic and oligopolis-
1
tic financial markets and controls on the capital account and finds that even in a world free
of transactions costs and counterparty risks, capital controls alone are not sufficient to cause
interest rates differentials to exist in equilibrium. The structure of domestic markets plays a
crucial role in determining the size of differentials. These predictions are validated by data
on low and middle income countries (Table 1). An index of bank concentration, defined
as the percentage of banking sector assets held by the three largest banks, is significant in
explaining absolute deviations between home and foreign interest rates, after controlling for
capital account openness. The greater the concentration in the banking sector, the larger
the absolute deviations between the home and foreign interest rates. The model described in
this paper explains this relationship as a consequence of the monopoly power of the domestic
financial institutions. The implication is that liberalization of the domestic financial sector
can act as a substitute to capital account openness, in this respect.
If the governments are able to tax away a part of the profits of the financial sector (which
may be the reason they restrict competition in this sector), then the paper also shows that
liberalizing capital controls and liberalizing domestic financial sector may be substitutable
policies in so far as their impact on government revenues is concerned. Trade openness, which
increases avenues for evasion of capital controls through misinvoicing 1 can also undermine
the rationale for financial repression, thus making financial liberalization - both domestic
and foreign - more palatable. Aizenman (2008) models this reduced incentive for repression
as an increase in cost of monitoring, while in an extension of my model that explicitly allows
1Prasad and Rajan (2008), Claessens and Naude (1993), Boyce and Ndikumana (2001), Collier et al.
(2001).
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for trade in goods, trade openness will reduce the revenues collected because of the erosion
of monopoly power of the domestic financial system.
2 Monopoly in Domestic Financial Sector
A small, partially open economy has two generations of agents at any point in time, each
with a two-period life. An agent born in (young in) period t has income Y Yt and faces income
uncertainty in the old age. With probability π(1) she has Y ot+1(1) = Y
Y
t (1 + ǫ) and with
probability π(2), she has Y ot+1(2) = Y
Y
t (1− ǫ). ǫ is a known positive number and represents
the ideosyncratic shock to second period income. Population of young and old at any time
is constant and normalized to 1. The aggregate income of the old at time t+ 1 is then Y ot+1
which equals π(1)Y Yt (1 + ǫ) + π(2)Y
Y
t (1− ǫ) = Y
Y
t [1 + (π(1)− π(2))ǫ]. (π(1)− π(2))ǫ then
is the macroeconomic shock. In the discussion that follows, I assume π(1) = π(2), unless
otherwise specified. The economy is assumed to be growing at a rate g, so that the young
of period t + 1 have an income Y Yt (1 + g). It is straightforward to show that g is also the
growth rate of the older generation’s income2.
Capital controls prevent the agents from accessing foreign markets for risk-free bonds, the
only asset available, but they can borrow from or lend to the domestic financial institution, at
the home rate of interest, rt. This assumption reflects the reality that while governments may
2When the young of period t are old in period t+1, a proportion π(1) will realize the positive shock and
a proportion π(2) will realize the negative shock. Since the population of each is normalized to 1, the total
income of the old in period t+ 1 equals Y o
t+1 = Y
Y
t
1 + (π(1)− π(2))ǫ = Y o
t
(1 + g).
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impose capital controls on its residents, rarely do countries have balanced current accounts.
Home lending is also risk-free.
The young agent at time t faces the following optimization problem:
Max EU = u(CYt ) + β
[
π(1)u(Cot+1(1)) + π(2)u(C
o
t+1(2))
]
, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0
s.t.
CYt = Y
Y
t −B
Y
t ≥ 0 (1)
Cot+1(s) = Y
o
t+1(s) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t ≥ 0; s = 1, 2
Assume that u(c) = log(c). Given the home interest rate in period t, rt, the young agent’s
demand for Bonds, BYt (which may be negative) is given by the solution to:
S(BYt , rt) = −u
′(Y Yt −B
Y
t )
+ β(1 + rt)π(1)u
′(Y Yt (1 + ǫ) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t )
+ β(1 + rt)π(2)u
′(Y Yt (1− ǫ) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t )
= 0 (2)
Note that SBYt < 0 and Srt ≶ 0 so that
δBYt
δrt
≶ 0, i.e. savings function may be backward
bending at very high interest rates or large savings. The above equation gives us the demand
for bonds (demand for loans when negative) as an implicit function of the domestic interest
rate, with first and second period incomes, probability of each state and discount factor as
parameters. The demand for bonds (or the supply of savings) increases with the first period
income and falls with the second period expected income and with the discount factor, β.
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While a larger adverse macroeconomic shock (larger π(2) or larger ǫ when π(1) < π(2))
always increases savings (figure 1), the impact of a pure ideosyncratic shock ǫ when π(1) =
π(2) is more nuanced and depends on the utility function under consideration. For the log
utility function assumed here, when ǫ is small to begin with, small increases in uncertainty
may reduce the supply of savings. A higher ǫ means a lower marginal utility in the good
state and a higher marginal utility in the bad state, other things being equal. The agent’s
optimality condition is that the expected marginal utility from period 2 (weighted by β(1+r))
equal period 1’s marginal utility. When ǫ is small to begin with, the consumptions in the
two states in period two are not too different and when epsilon increases, if the loss in
marginal utility from higher consumtion in good state is higher than the gain in marginal
utility from lower consumtion in bad state3, the agent will compensate by increasing period 1
consumption by reducing saving. As figure 2 below shows, for small increases in ǫ beginning
from ǫ = 0, the supply of savings first shifts down and starts shifting up only after ǫ > 0.1.
The financial institution is a Stackelberg leader and a monopolistic supplier of financial
servies to the agents. He takes the agents’ demand function for bonds and uses it to set
domestic interest rate that maximizes his profits in each period. He can borrow or lend also
at the foreign risk free interest rate, and his total exposure to foreign markets at time t is
just the young generation’s saving. The financial institution’s period t optimization problem
is given by:
Πt = −(rt − r
∗
t )B
Y
t
3and this will happen if the utility function is very curved.
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s.t.
S(BYt , rt) = 0
rt ≥ 0
Its optimization conditions reduce to:
rt − r
∗
t = B
Y
t
SBYt
Srt
=
−BYt
BYtr
(3)
The two equations, 2 and 3 give the equilibrium values of domestic interest rate and
saving in period t. The monopoly power of the domestic financial institution means that
there is a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates that persists in equlibrium.
This interest differential increases with the patience of the young generation, i.e. the value it
puts on the tomorrow’s consumption, β. The higher the β, the more the young agent values
tomorrow’s consumption therefore the less elastic the demand for bonds, thus increasing
the financial intermediary’s monopoly power (see figure 3 for an illustrative example). The
interest differential does not change with the growth rate for the log utility function, unless
the size of the shock varies with the growth rate (figure 4).
Domestic interest rate increases with foreign interest rate, although the relationship is
not linear. Domestic rate is lower than the foreign rate when the young generation in period
t has positive savings and it is higher than the foreign interest rate when young generation
is a net borrower from the rest of the world in period t. In either case, monopoly profits are
positive. Governments that are able to tax these profits more easily than incomes may find
it optimal to preserve monopoly profits by restricting competition in the domestic economy
6
and by imposing capital controls. Note that this model can also be used to explain why
informal sector interest rates are higher than formal sector rates in developing countries
where formal sector has limited access.
Depending on other parameter values, for low values of foreign interest rate, equlibrium
real interest rate in the domestic economy may be zero or negative (it has been constrained
in the figures to be at least zero). Savings by young generation may be positive even with
negative real interest rates.
The Current Account (CA) balance in period t is the difference between the young
generation’s saving and the old generation’s dissaving, and if the two generations are same
in all respects, then equals zero. The link between the interest differential and CA balance
is therefore, broken. A positive interest differential between home and abroad need not
be associated with capital inflows, but can be associated with no net flows or with capital
outflows (CA surplus). A positive interest differential (rt− r
∗
t > 0) is associated with young
generation’s borrowing. The CA balance increases with the growth rate of the economy, as
the younger generation saves more than the older generation dissaves (figure 4). As long
as the economy has a positive growth rate, the current account balance increases with the
patience parameter, β and falls with the macroeconomic shock. The larger the reduction in
old age’s expected income, the greater the saving of the young, and the higher the current
account surplus if the incomes of the young are growing. Growing economies that see their
social security systems become inadequate as governments withdraw from the economy or
that have a disproportionately large share of higher income opportunities available to the
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young could see larger surpluses in their external accounts. This is consistent with the
evidence provided in Chamon and Prasad (2007) and Chou, Liu and Hammitt (2003). The
former explain the increase in China’s saving rate for cohorts in their 40’s and 50’s in the
beginning of the 1990’s as a result of the increase in prospects of incurring lumpy and
uncertain health expenditures with few working years left to benefit from the reforms. They
estimate an increase in the health and education expenditures from 2 percent of household
consumption expenditures in 1995 to 14 per cent in 2005. Chou, Liu and Hammitt (2003)
estimate that the universalization of health insurance reduced Taiwan’s savings rate by 2.5
per cent.
3 Oligopoly in Domestic Financial Markets
In this section, I assume that the government allows limited liberalisation of the domestic
financial sector, so that the number of financial intermediaries in the domestic sector exceeds
1. Assume that post-liberalisation, the domestic market becomes a financial oligopoly, with
a limited number of cournot oligopolists who take the domestic demand (for loans or bonds,
as the case maybe) as given and compete on quantities. The young agent’s maximization
problem at time t is the same as in the previous section, equations (1), with BYt reinterpreted
as the sum of agent lending to all financial institutions. Agent optimization yields the familiar
first order necessary condition, the market demand for bonds given by equation (2).
Each financial institution takes the market demand and the other financial institutions’
quantity at time t as given and maximizes its own profit, which gives the optimization
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problem:
Πjt = −(rt − r
∗
t )b
Y
tj
s.t.
S(BYt , rt) = 0
BYt =
n∑
j=1
bYtj
The jth financial institution’s optimization conditions reduce to:
rt − r
∗
t = b
Y
tj
SbY
tj
Srt
=
−bYtj
BYtr
(4)
Together, these imply that the total market demand for bonds (which may be negative)
is, as usual, split equally between the n intermediaries in equilibrium. That is, bYtj =
BYt
n
. The
home interest rate and volume of financial transactions are then determined by the solution
to:
f(BYt , rt) =
−1
Y Yt −B
Y
t
+
βπ(1)(1 + rt)
Y2(1) + (1 + rt)BYt
+
βπ(2)(1 + rt)
Y2(2) + (1 + rt)BYt
= 0
rt = r
∗
t +
−bYtj
BYtr
(5)
Comparing the equilibirum conditions for monopoly (3) and oligopoly (5), it is clear
that the interest rate differential is lower and volume of transactions higher the larger the
number of players in the domestic market. Domestic agent’s welfare is unambiguously higher.
A government that cares both about the welfare of its agents and its tax revenues may then
find it optimal to set a finite limit to the number of financial intermediaries, n. Moreover, if
9
financial depth is related to growth rate of the economy, as previous studies have suggested,
then the optimal n will be larger than when financial intermediation activities are not helpful
to growth. On the other hand, the larger the constraints on direct-tax raising abilities of the
government and the more valuable the public services to the agents, the lower the optimal
n.
As far as the impact on current account is concerned, financial liberalisation, even if
limited, increases the generational saving/dissaving. Conditional on the CA imbalance being
non-zero, financial liberalization thus exacerbates the imbalances in current account (figure
5). This may partly explain the growing current account surpluses in emerging markets in
the last decade of liberalization and constitutes and important consideration that has been
missing in recent studies on global imbalances. Another important result of this section is
that liberalization of domestic financial sector, even when capital controls continue to be
effective, leads to lower interest differential between home and abroad. Imperfections in
the domestic financial market and capital controls interact to determine the size of interest
differentials.
4 Limited access to foreign markets
This section considers the impact of limited capital account liberalization that provides the
agents some access to foreign markets. International trade has expanded at a rapid pace
in the last two decades and trade can allow a country’s residents to evade capital controls
through misinvoicing. In an extension of this model that allows for more than one good,
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such liberalization as considered in this section can be explicitly modeled to result from an
expansion of trade.
Assume that the young agent is allowed to borrow and lend upto B¯ in the foreign market
at the foreign interest rate, r∗t and must meet any spillover demands for financial intermedi-
ation at home, at the home interest rate. B¯ then is a metric of openness, with larger values
representing greater openness. The agent’s optimization problem now is:
MaxEU = u(CYt ) + β
[
π(1)u(Cot+1(1)) + π(2)u(C
o
t+1(2))
]
s.t.
CYt = Y
Y
t −B
Y
t −B
∗
t (6)
Cot+1(s) = Y
o
t+1(s) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t + (1 + r
∗
t )B
∗
t ; s = 1, 2 (7)
−B¯ ≤ B∗t ≤ B¯ (8)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that when rt = r
∗
t , B
∗ is strictly between the bounds given
by [−B¯, B¯] and total demand for bonds by young at time t is given by the solution to:
S(Bt, rt) =
−1
Y Yt −Bt
+
βπ(1)(1 + r∗t )
Y ot+1(1) + (1 + r
∗
t )Bt
+
βπ(2)(1 + r∗t )
Y ot+1(2) + (1 + r
∗
t )Bt
= 0 (9)
where Bt = B
∗
t + B
Y
t . In this case the split between foreign and domestic transactions
is indeterminate and we can only determine the net borrowing or lending. Note, however
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that when rt = r
∗
t , the profits of the financial institution(s) are zero, so nothing is lost by
assuming that all financial intermediation is done abroad.
When rt 6= r
∗
t , the foreign borrowing and lending limit must be fully exhausted. Either
B∗t = B¯ or B
∗
t = −B¯. Lets consider each case in turn:
1. When B∗t = B¯, domestic lending by the young agent (deposits with the domestic
financial institution) is given by the solution B˜Yt to:
S˜(BYt , rt) =
−1
Y Yt −B
Y
t − B¯
+
βπ(1)(1 + rt)
Y ot+1(1) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t + (1 + r
∗
t )B¯
+
βπ(2)(1 + rt)
Y ot+1(2) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t + (1 + r
∗
t )B¯
= 0 (10)
Lets call this solution Ξ˜ = (−B¯, B˜Yt ).
2. When B∗ = −B¯, domestic borrowing by the young agent is given by the solution, BˆYt
to:
Sˆ(BYt , rt) =
−1
Y Yt −B
Y
t + B¯
+
βπ(1)(1 + rt)
Y ot+1(1) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t − (1 + r
∗
t )B¯
+
βπ(2)(1 + rt)
Y ot+1(2) + (1 + rt)B
Y
t − (1 + r
∗
t )B¯
= 0 (11)
Lets call this solution Ξˆ = (−B¯, BˆYt ).
The borrower’s demand for bonds is given by Ξ = argmaxΞˆ,Ξ˜EU .
The financial monopolist maximizes its profits given the young agent’s demand for bonds.
If it sets domestic interest rate lower than the foreign rate, then in a subgame perfect
equilibrium, the young agent’s domestic demand for bonds is necessarily positive and vice
versa. We may therfore derive his optimal choice as the argmax of the profits from the two
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cases, one with agent demand given by Ξˆ and the second with agent demand given by Ξ˜. In
the third case, when the agent doesn’t exhaust her foreign access limits, the monopolist finds
it optimal to set r = r∗ and we can only determine the agent’s total saving or borrowing.
As noted in section 2, except at very high r∗ or very low probability of the bad state,
the agent’s saving supply schedule is upward sloping. For a fall in expected income in the
second period, this means that as r∗ increases, the agent’s savings increase, which means
that there is a critical foreign interest rate at which the agent switches from underutilizing
her foreign saving limit to being constrained by it. The larger the foreign access limit, the
larger this critical foreign interest rate. Furthur, the lower the first period income relative to
the foreign borrowing/lending limit, the higher the critical rate (as it means a lower saving
supply schedule). Figures 6 and 7 show the results from numerical simulations using the
’fmincon’ routine of MATLAB 4. These confirm that the higher the level of openness, the
higher the critical foreign interest rate below which there is interest rate equalization. This
implies that during periods of excess liquidity or low global interest rates, as in the first few
years of the twenty first century, one would see interest rate convergence, even if the levels
4The profit maximization exercise used information from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to arrive at the
solution. The three possible solutions are for the agent to exhaust her saving limit abroad and save at home,
or to exhaust her borrowing limit abroad and borrow at home or for total borrowing or saving to be less than
the foreign limits in which case the home interest rate equals the foreign rate. The financial institution’s
profit was maximized in each of these cases over domestic borrowing and interest rate. The solution picked
was one in which the agent’s choice given the domestic interest rate chosen by the monopolist was the same
as the one chosen by the monopolist. Furthur, this exercise was repeated for several initial values of domestic
borrowing and interest rate and the solution plotted was one which maximized the profits between these
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of de-jure openness remained the same, thus creating conditions conducive to liberalization
of the financial sector.
The existence of a critical foreign interest rate below which there is complete elimina-
tion of interest differentials also brings in the possibility of sudden shifts in current account
balances as the threshold is crossed. Growth in income for example, may make price discrim-
ination for the young generation profitable when it was not profitable for the old generation
- leading to a dip in the current account. The current account surplus may be higher with
lower global interest rates in a growing economy. The plot of current account in figure 6
below should not be interpeted as the path of current account as r∗ falls, but rather the
current account when both generations of the economy faced the same r∗ shown on the
x-axis. This figure then says that in a period of global low interest rates, current accounts
maybe larger for the same income and risk profile of both generations. Figure 7 charts the
evolution of the current account as the world interest rate falls from 0.15 to 0.1 in period
9. The current account dips for each level of openness, as the old generation’s dissaving at
time t is determined by their saving at time t − 1 but the young generation’s saving drop
because of the lower interest rate.
The simulation results also show that the equilibrium interest rate differential falls with
the level of openness. The higher the level of openness therefore, the lower the profits of
the domestic financial institution and the lower the revenues from repression. Liberalization
of domestic financial sector by increasing the number of intermediaries and opening up of
the capital account both reduce revenues from repression and are therefore equivalent from
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the public finance perspective. In a multi-good version of this model, large expansion of
trade would lead to relaxation of capital controls, thus eliminating monopoly profits and
undermining the tax-based argument for domestic financial repression.
5 A Test
In this section, the predictions of the model are tested using data on low and middle income
countries between 1970 and 2004. The dependent variable is the absolute value of interest
differential between country i and the world, computed using nominal deposit interest rates
in country i and the 3-month London Eurodollar rate, both measured in percent per annum.
The model predicts that this absolute differential is a function of the world interest rate, the
lack of competition in the domestic financial market, the level of capital controls, the level of
foreign lending, the size of ideosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks (which may themselves
depend on the growth rate and level of external market openness). More specifically, it
predicts that the absolute interest differential increases with the monopoly power in the
domestic financial sector and with the restrictiveness of capital controls. The differential is
predicted to decrease with the foreign interest rate if the home interest rate is higher than
foreign interest rate and vice versa. The degree of monopoly power in the domestic market
is measured by the concentration variable, which is the ratio of assets of three largest banks
to the total banking sector assets. Capital controls are measured by the de-jure restrictions
(Chinn-Ito (2007) measure) and the de-facto measure by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
which measures the quantity of cross border flows.
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In addition to these variables, I use inflation and growth rates at home and abroad (since
the interest rates used are nominal interest rates) as well as the absolute inflation differentials
and absolute growth differentials. I also use actual reserve ratio in the banking sector as a
proxy of financial repression and two measures of financial depth, the ratio of broad money
(M3) to GDP and domestic credit to private sector as pergentage of GDP 5. The panel
data regressions assumed country fixed effects and the standard errors were corrected for
heteroskedasticity and cluster-correlation. The results are presented in table 1 below.
The more concentrated the banking assets in a country, the larger the interest differentials
between that country and the world market. The effect is significantly different from zero
at 5 per cent level in all specifications. Both measures of capital account openness are also
significant in explaining the interest differentials. Higher capital account openness reduces
interest differentials, as expected. Financial repression as measured by reserve ratios is
not significant in explaining the absolute differential between home and foreign interest
rates. The positive sign of the financial depth variables is not necessarily contraditory
to the predictions of the model. For a given level of banking sector concentration, the
larger the market over which the sector exercises its monopoly power, the larger the interest
differentials.
5See data appendix for furthur details on each of these variables and data sources
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6 Conclusions
This paper presented a simple overlapping generations model with financial repression in the
form of limited competition in the domestic financial sector coupled with controls on the
capital account. The model is able to make interesting and realistic predictions about the
real interest differentials and the current accounts. It emphsizes the role of domestic financial
development in achieving financial integration (defined as interest convergence) with the rest
of the world. It also highlights the role of domestic financial liberalisation and low global
interest rates in causing the high current account surpluses in emerging markets in the last
decade or so. The model provides a fiscal policy based explanation of the linkages between
trade openness and financial openness that have been observed in other studies (Aizenman,
2008; Jinjarak, 2006). Although the model is simple, it makes realistic predictions as seen
in the empirical exercise.
The model can be extended in several directions. Allowing for investment in the economy
would allow the growth rate to depend on the intermediation activities of the financial insti-
tutions and reveal the policy dilemmmas more clearly. Also, allowing for more than one good
would explicitly allow trade between domestic and foreign agents and allow one to explore
the impact of trade liberalization as distinguished from that of capital account liberalization.
Finally the model could easily be reinterpreted as a model of informal sector when access
to formal sector lending in an economy is limited and then be used to explore the impact of
growth, of liberalization of formal sector and removal of priority lending requirements in the
formal sector, on overall financial access and welfare.
17
References
[1] Aizenman, J. 2008. On the Hidden Links between Financial and Trade Opening. Journal
of International Money and Finance 27, 372-86.
[2] Bernhard, W., Leblang, D., 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commit-
ments. International Organization 53 (1), 71-97.
[3] Boyce, J.K., Ndikumana, L., 2001. Is Africa a net creditor? New estimates of capital flight
from severely indebted sub-Saharan African countries, 1970-1996. Journal of Development
Studies 38 (2), 27- 56.
[4] Chamon, M., Prasad, E., 2007. Why are Saving Rates of Urban Households in China
Rising? IZA discussion Paper No. 3191.
[5] Chinn, M., 2006. The (Partial) Rehabilitation Of Interest Rate Parity In Floating Rate
Era: Longer Horizons, Alternative Expectations And Emerging Markets. Journal Of In-
ternational Money And Finance 25, 7-21
[6] Chinn, M., Ito, H., 2006. What matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls,
Institutions, and Interactions. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 163-92.
[7] Chinn, M.D., Meredith, G., 2004. Monetary Policy And Long Horizon Uncovered Interest
Parity. IMF Staff Papers 51 (3), 409-430.
[8] Chou, Shin-Yi, Jin-Tan Liu, and James K. Hammitt, 2003, National Health Insurance
and Precautionary Saving: Evidence from Taiwan Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10),
1873-94.
18
[9] Claessens, S., Naude D., 1993. Recent Estimates of Capital Flight. Policy Research Work-
ing Papers, WPS 1186. World Bank, Washington, DC.
[10] Collier, P., Hoeﬄer, A., Pattillo, C., 2001. Flight Capital as a Portfolio Choice. World
Bank Economic Review 15 1 (2001), pp. 5580
[11] Eichengreen, B., 2001.Capital Account Liberalization: What do Cross-Country Studies
Tell Us? The World Bank Economic Review, 15(3) 341-365.
[12] Espinosa, M., Yip, C.K., 1996. ”An endogenous growth model of money, banking, and
financial repression,” Working Paper 96-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[13] Giovannini, A., de Melo, M., 1993. Government revenue from financial repression. Amer-
ican Economic Review 83 (4), 953-963.
[14] Gourinchas, P., Jeanne, O., 2006. The Elusive Gains from International Financial Inte-
gration, Review of Economic Studies, 73(3), 715-741.
[15] Henry, P.B., 2007. Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and Speculation.
Stanford University CDDRL Working Paper No. 72
[16] Jinjarak, Y., 2006. Adis Government Revenue from Financial Repression: More on the
Consequences of Financial and Trade Integration. NTU Working Paper.
[17] Kletzer, K., Kohli, R., 2001. Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in
Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India. IMF Working Paper
01/103.
19
[18] Lane, P., Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., 2006. The External Wealth Of Nations: Revised and
Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004. IMF Working Paper No.
69, March 2006.
[19] McKinnon, R. I. (I973). Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
[20] Pasricha, G.K., 2008. Financial Integration in Emerging Market Economies. University
of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 641, May 2008
[21] Prasad, E. , Rajan. R.G., 2008. A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberaliza-
tion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22 (3), 149-172
[22] Roubini, N., Sala-i-Martin, X., 1995. A Growth Model of Inflation, Tax Evasion and
Financial Repression. Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 275-301.
[23] Shaw, E. S. (I973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York: Oxford
University Press.
[24] Singh, M., Banerjee, A., 2006. Testing Real Interest Parity in Emerging Markets. IMF
Working Paper No. 249
[25] Vieria, I. 2003. Evaluating Capital Mobility In The EU: A New Approach Using Swaps
Data. The European Journal Of Finance, 9, 214-232.
20
7 Data Appendix
Dependent variable in table 1 is the absolute value of the difference between the nominal
deposit interest rate in country i and the 3 month Eurodollar rate, both expressed in eprcent
per annum and sourced from International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Concentration is the ratio of the assets of three largest banks
to the total banking sector assets, with peak concentration ratio equal to 1 (Source: World
Bank). Inflation gdp is the domestic inflation measured by GDP deflator from World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI). Abs(Inflation diff) is the absolute value of difference between
domestic inflation (GDP deflator) and inflation in the US (Source: WDI). Reserve Ratio is
the ratio of total liquid reserves to assets ratio for the banking sector expressed as a percent-
age, a proxy for required reserve ratios (Source: WDI). GDP growth is in percent per annum
and is from WDI. Abs(GDP Growth Diff) is the absolute value of domestic GDP growth
and that of US. M3 (% of GDP) is the ratio if broad money to GDP and DomCrPvtZgdp is
the domestic credit to private sector, in percent (Source: WDI). These are two proxies for
financial depth. KAopen LMF is the Lane Milesi-Feretti (2006) index of capital openness
(sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP, expressed as a percentage). KAopen CI is
the Chinn-Ito (2007) index of de-jure capital account openness.
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Table 1. Absolute Domestic - Foreign Interest Differential and Bank
Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eurodollar3m -0.268* -0.315** -0.280* -0.296*
(0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.156)
Concentration 6.234** 7.194** 7.795** 8.557**
(3.117) (3.242) (3.376) (3.463)
Inflation gdp 0.253*** 0.255***
(0.0555) (0.0537)
Inflation gdp US -1.005** -0.954**
(0.467) (0.456)
M3 (% of GDP) 0.0316 0.0162
(0.0314) (0.0317)
KAopen CI -1.211*** -1.293*** -1.193*** -1.253***
(0.325) (0.325) (0.347) (0.345)
KAopen LMF -0.0236** -0.0241*** -0.0249*** -0.0255***
(0.00923) (0.00891) (0.00892) (0.00858)
Reserve Ratio 0.00323 0.0152 0.00751 0.0154
(0.0254) (0.0251) (0.0247) (0.0249)
GDP Growth -0.281*** -0.263***
(0.0590) (0.0589)
GDP Growth (US) -0.403*** -0.424***
(0.135) (0.135)
abs(Inflation gdp diff) 0.284*** 0.284***
(0.0600) (0.0586)
abs(GDP gr diff) 0.110 0.0987
(0.107) (0.103)
DomCrPvtZgdp 0.0702** 0.0563**
(0.0276) (0.0283)
Constant 3.827 2.364 8.487*** 6.721**
(2.727) (2.585) (2.898) (3.006)
Observations 872 872 872 872
Number of coden 94 94 94 94
R2 0.322 0.329 0.345 0.350
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations include all observations for Middle and Low income countries (WB classification) for which deposit rates and
GDP deflator inflation rates were less than 100% per annum and bank reserve ratios less than 100%. Fixed effects estimator
22
with standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity and cluster-correlation.
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Figure 1: Variation in π(1), probability of good state. The figure plots the home interest rate in
period t, r, the Current Account as percentage of GDP in period t (CAGDP ), the profits of the domestic
financial sector (Profitt) and the domestic saving by the young generation in period t as a function of
period t foreign interest rate, r∗ for different values of the probability of good state, pi(1). Y Y
t−1 = 100,
GDPt = Y
Y
t
+ Y o
t
.
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Figure 2: Supply of Saving and Monopolist’s Best Response Functions, g = 0.5, π(1) =
0.5, β = 0.9, r∗ = 0.4. Downward sloping curves are the agent’s demand for domestic bonds and
the upward sloping curves the Monopolist’s best response functions for different values of the ideosyncratic
shock.
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Figure 3: Variation in β. The figure plots the home interest rate in period t, r, the Current Account as
percentage of GDP in period t (CAGDPt), the profits of the domestic financial sector (Profitst) and the
domestic saving by the young generation in period t as a function of period t foreign interest rate, r∗ for
different values of the discount factor, β. Y Y
t−1 = 100, GDPt = Y
Y
t
+ Y o
t
.
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Figure 4: Variation in Growth Rates. The figure plots the home interest rate in period t, r, the
Current Account as percentage of GDP in period t (CAGDP ), the profits of the domestic financial sector
(Profitst) and the domestic saving by the young generation in period t as a function of period t foreign
interest rate, r∗ for different values of the growth rate, g. Y Y
t−1 = 100, GDPt = Y
Y
t
+ Y o
t
.
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Figure 5: Variation in Number of Financial Institutions. The figure plots the home interest
rate in period t, r, the Current Account as percentage of GDP in period t (CAGDP ), the total profits of
the domestic financial sector (Profitt) and the total domestic saving by the young generation in period
t as a function of period t foreign interest rate, r∗ for different number of domestic financial institutions.
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Figure 6: Agent Access to Foreign Markets. The figure plots the home interest rate in period t,
r, the Current Account as percentage of GDP in period t (CAGDPt), the profits of the domestic financial
sector (Profitt) and the total saving by the young generation in period t when both generations face the
same foreign interest rate, r∗, plotted on the x-axis, for different values of the foreign borrowing and lending
limit, B∗. Y Y
t−1 = 100, GDPt = Y
Y
t
+ Y o
t
.
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Figure 7: Dynamics of a Fall in Foreign Interest Rate. The figure plots the home interest rate, r,
the Current Account as percentage of GDP, CAGDP , the profits of the domestic financial sector (Profit)
and the domestic saving by the young generation over time as foreign interest rate falls from 0.4 in periods
0 to 8 to 0.2 in period 9 and stays there. GDP in time t equals Y Y
t
+ Y o
t
.
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